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A Review by Thorsten Botz-Bornstein, Gulf University for Science and Technology, Kuwait 
 
 
What is the difference between a mind and a brain or, more precisely, between a 
mind-image and a brain-image? Media and Film Studies professor Patricia Pisters of the 
University of Amsterdam engages in the monumental project of establishing, in over 350 
pages of monograph, the idea that “[t]oday’s viewers no longer look through a character’s 
eyes; instead, they move through his or her brain or mental landscape”, as the text on the 
back cover argues. Either we literally enter brain-worlds, as happens for instance in Inception 
(Christopher Nolan, 2010), or a brain enters a body, as in Avatar (James Cameron, 2009). In 
Inception individuals infiltrate the subconscious of their targets, while in Avatar a remotely 
controlled human brain enters an alien’s body. As a consequence, argues Pisters, “a 
transdisciplinary encounter between film, philosophy, and neuroscience is not only important 
but also necessary to pursue” (27). The book guides us through Deleuzian philosophy and 
neuroscientific research, and provides detailed accounts of a variety of films that are taken 
from the repertoire of “globalized cinema” (2). The latter is defined as a screen culture in 
which screens “are themselves always already connected to assemblages of power, capital, 
and transnational movements of peoples, goods, and information” (2). In passing, the 
relationship between philosophy and neurology will also be established by Pisters. This is an 
ambitious program indeed; Pisters’s final objective is to show that “contemporary culture has 
moved from considering images as ‘illusions of reality’ to considering them as ‘realities of 
illusions’ that operate directly on our brains and therefore as real agents in the world” (6). 
 
Let’s unfold Pisters’s analysis. Deleuze argues “that the brain is also the screen, and 
the screen can work as a brain”, and Pisters wants to explain “how exactly the brain and the 
(film) screen can work as a meeting place for art, science, and philosophy” (14). Other 
questions appear immediately: “How does the neuro-image relate to the spirit of Web 2.0?”; 
“Does the neuro-image testify to this contemporary database logic” (an archive culture 
providing us with the “remixabilty of contemporary digital culture”)? (10). Obviously, “the 
neuro-image also has a strong relationship to the virtual” (71). Pisters wants to see the virtual 
“in connection to our brains rather than in connection to the virtuality of the filmic image 
itself, as information and art” (71). All this will lead to the definition of a third type of cinema 
(the first two being Deleuze’s time-image and movement-image), which is based on the 
neuro-image inspired by Deleuze and Guattari’s expression of “assemblage of circumstances” 
mentioned in A Thousand Plateaus (91). Both the time-image and the neuro-image make 
visible the virtual, but they pursue different approaches (21). In other words, while the 
movement-image and the time-image let us see the world through the characters’ eyes, the 
neuro-image projects us into their mental worlds (14). 
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In principle, the book is about establishing cinema’s connection to the operations of 
the mind, an idea introduced already by Hugo Münsterberg, but whose entire scope has been 
uncovered only relatively recently (see Carroll). Deleuze and Guattari refer to basic 
connections between the brain and cinema and, more precisely, between rhizomatic thinking 
and neuroscientific studies of the brain. They do so by presenting the brain as “a continuously 
changing process [which is] therefore fundamentally connected to movement and time” (15). 
Knowledge brought about by new sciences enters the images but those images penetrate our 
scientific knowledge in return. This is where things get complicated. My hypothesis is that 
Pisters’s analysis aims to show that in recent decades our logistic of perception has become 
overly fast, relying on a simultaneity of perception provided by multiple screens and the 
constant exposure to multiple sources of information, while at the same time the 
neurosciences have made possible the visualisation of the “brain image”. Pisters’s task is to 
show that these two phenomena are linked. The danger is to commit the non causa pro causa 
fallacy, which presupposes that two things must be linked simply because they occur at the 
same time. Probably there is a link, but it must be elaborated in a very systematic fashion. I 
am not sure whether Pisters’s book is systematic enough to demonstrate that brain-image 
cinema has really been caused by the fast and simultaneous appearance of images in our 
environment. Similar considerations can be applied to other phenomena whose sudden 
emergence is striking; for example, the fact that many recently released films play tricks with 
our brains or take brain manipulation as their subject—such as Neil Burger’s The Illusionist 
(2006) and Christopher Nolan’s The Prestige (2006); or the increasing fascination with 
mathematics (or the mind of the mad scientist) in popular culture and in cinema, as in Gus 
van Sant’s Good Will Hunting (1997), Ron Howard’s A Beautiful Mind (2000), John 
Madden’s Proof (2005). These phenomena must be linked in some way, but how?   
 
 
The Neuro-Image 
 
What is the neuro-image? “The neuro-image testifies to how the brain has become our 
world and how the world has become a brain-city, a brain-world” (33). The neuro-image is 
much more complex than the mindscreen image suggested by Bruce Kawin, which considers 
the possibility that the film’s self-consciousness originates in itself, making the film into a 
“first person” speaking to us like a like narrator without being a narrator. That was forty years 
ago. In the twenty-first century it is not the mind that is a screen but the brain. What’s the 
difference?  
 
Perhaps the main difference resides not in what they are but in what they are seen to 
be. Interest has shifted from a metaphorical mind to a literal, surgical, medical brain. 
However, this is not the only difference. Neuro-image theory goes further as it considers not 
only the brain itself but also the omnipresence of the media; in particular, the omnipresence 
of media screens that work on the brain. Pisters wants neuro-image films to “anticipate a 
digital logic: reassembling the past or even presenting various futures; setting up database-
like alternatives of images and objects, biographies and ages; and delegating the creation of 
the story to the spectator’s mind” (156).1 The neuro-image is thus a mindscreen determined 
by participatory digital culture and surveillance cameras and Pisters wants to show that “the 
screen itself can no longer be considered a window or a painting, but [that] it rather 
constitutes a table of information, a surface inscribed with data” (118).  
 
The surveillance camera phenomenon is examined at length through a discussion of 
Jill Magid’s Evidence Locker project (2004), which consisted in using the 242 public 
	   
 
Alphaville: Journal of Film and Screen Media 
Issue 4, Winter 2012 
3 
surveillance cameras of Liverpool as her film crew. Pisters shows that “CCTV screens, 
satellite tracking grids, GPS positioning on mobile displays, webcams, Internet polling, and 
other networked surveillance data (from governments, companies, or peer-to-peer data) 
constitute a new kind of apparatus, a complete surveillance apparatus” (98). A further aspect 
to be examined is the archival character of cinema. When watching the Lumière Brothers’ 
Workers Leaving the Lumière Factory in Lyon (La Sortie des usines Lumière à Lyon, 1895) 
we ask ourselves “what exactly is being archived in the preservation of this early film: the 
details of costumes in 1895, the gestures of the workers, the patterns of light and shade across 
the entrance, or the film as a meaningful artifact?” (223).2 At the same time, this raises the 
unanswered question of whether Pisters wishes to establish neuro-cinema as a recent 
phenomenon, or wants to say that films have always been neuro-images. 
 
Woven into Pisters’s argumentation is an analysis of schizophrenia in capitalism or of 
schizophrenia as “a specific mode of psychic and social functioning that is characteristically 
both produced and repressed by capitalist economy” (38). Schizophrenia is related to 
“delirium cinema” and “in the twenty-first century both our knowledge of the brain and the 
situation of the audiovisually mediated world seem to invite new thoughts about ‘schizoid 
minds’ and ‘schizoid screens’” (38). All this is captivating and could potentially be rendered 
within the limits of a book-length study. But Pisters is trying to do more than this; she also 
shows that Alain Resnais is a “Web 2.0 filmmaker”, for instance, and expresses a 
“Bergsonian metaphysics” (146, 156); and she offers excursuses on themes like Spinoza’s 
protobiologism (suggested by Antonio Damasio in his Looking for Spinoza). On occasion, 
these digressions can overburden the flow of the overall argument. 
 
However, the principal difficulty that makes any research on the neuro-image so 
complicated, and that at times creates difficulties for Pisters, is that the relationship between 
the screen and the brain is always reciprocal. It’s not just that the screens reflect our brains; 
the “multiple screens have quite literally entered our minds to present a logistics of 
perception” (25). The absorption of reality by the neuro-image leads to a disappearance of 
reality that is much more radical than anything imagined by prophets of simulation like 
Baudrillard. The screen (wherever it is supposed to be) “is a manipulative force that has the 
power to create (new) circuits in the brain”, but the “brain itself has certain controlling 
powers as well” (96). 
 
The territory explored here is quite new, which is why such basic questions need to be 
answered, primarily: where should we “be situating the screen (in relation to the neuro-
image). Should it be quite literally inside the brain or situated externally?” (27). I perceive a 
problem in Chapter One that is closely related to the reciprocal character of neuro-images. I 
do not understand if the brain is here formally seen as a screen, and if cinema is therefore a 
brain, or whether Pisters is just talking about films that narrate schizophrenic states of mind 
but which are not schizophrenic themselves. In other words, there must be a difference 
between a schizophrenic film and a film about schizophrenia. Unclear sentences like “I will 
refer closely … to contemporary questions in neuroscience and film-philosophy in which the 
powers of the false articulate a more general schizoanalytical power of the image” (74) do not 
facilitate understanding. 
 
The list of films analysed is very long and I will name only a few: Michael Clayton 
(Tony Gilroy, 2007) is a film that insists on brain processes. Elia Suleiman’s The Time that 
Remains (2009) “can be considered a neuro-image by way of its temporal dimensions based 
in the third synthesis of time” (267) and in his Divine Intervention (Yadon ilaheyya, 2002) 
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“the filmmaker mixes expected codes to create something new by bringing the actual and the 
virtual, private and public, violence and laughter together in challenging mixed circuits of a 
burlesque political style” (257). Suleiman’s Chronicle of a Disappearance (1996) is seen as 
“a time-image, which, next to its strong relations to the virtuality of the past, has significant 
openings to the first synthesis of time as well” (266). Brian De Palma’s Redacted (2007) has 
a “reflexive ‘metascreen’ aspect [which] is now typical for the contemporary cinema screen 
of the neuro-image in general and of war cinema in particular” (280). Andrea Arnold’s Red 
Road (2006) is an “affective neurothriller” populated by schizos (113). Furthermore, the 
already mentioned The Illusionist and The Prestige (2006) and The Dark Knight (2008), both 
by Christopher Nolan, are linked to Deleuze’s concept of the powers of the false. 
 
Sometimes the long introductions to the films can make the reader impatient as 
indications of how the film relates to the book’s discussions are only given at a very late 
stage. This is particularly true for the long description of Pontecorvo’s The Battle of Algiers 
(La battaglia di Algeri, 1966). Explanations of the Franco-Algerian conflict unfold over ten 
pages before they are embedded into the context of the neuro-image discussion. The link 
consists in the fact that the film makes “us more conscious of the complex layers of historical 
events and their relation to the present” (237). The television series Lost (2004–10) is 
declared to be a neuro-image because it is “an audiovisual recovery of the mythological life 
of the desert island, presenting ways of imagining rebirth and second beginnings” (156). 
However, this sentence is preceded by an eighteen-page description of Lost that gives the 
reader no opportunity to anticipate the direction of the discussion.  
 
Pisters makes an immense effort to bring across her idea of an all-embracing neuro-
image that she perceives in many filmic texts. Because of the large empirical and theoretical 
fields that the book tries to address, some theoretical patterns are bound to become vague; 
sometimes the discourse moves too quickly towards generalisations. Does any manipulation 
of reality turn a film into a neuro-image? In that case, the list of neuro-image films would be 
too extended. All films are archives in some way, but we should not call them all neuro-films 
because, once again, the list would become too lengthy. My remarks are perhaps very basic 
when compared with Pisters’s powerful theoretical machine that spins in so many directions. 
This is an impressive book that represents a cornerstone in a new vague of cinema research 
that skilfully brings together continental philosophy and cognitive science. To me, it adds a 
brick to the wall built by authors whom Pisters—quite curiously—almost never mentions: 
Bruce Kawin’s and Daniel Frampton’s attempts to describe the aesthetic experience of film in 
terms that go clearly beyond Deleuze’s conceptual analyses of movement and time; or 
Warren Buckland’s combination of semiotic and cognitive paradigms. 
 
 
 
Notes 
	  
1 Pisters makes this specific claim with regard to Alain Resnais. 
 
2 Pisters here quotes Mary Ann Doane. 
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